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Cuba's Financial Situation
By C . M . C L A R K , Acting Manager, Havana Office

G

E N E R A L post-war conditions augmented by the reaction from an unbridled speculation in sugar and an almost
total prostration of the Port of Havana
have brought upon Cuba its financial
crisis. Delayed by the moratorium but
not averted, the latest development has
been the closing of the doors of what had
been Cuba's most important banking institution. M u c h greater panic would,
doubtless, have resulted had it not been
for the American and Canadian banks
with the reserves of their parent organizations behind them.
Dating as far back as the year 1918, the
Port of Havana has been subjected to
serious strikes interfering with the delivery
of goods. During the closing months of
the war, it became extremely difficult for
merchants in Havana to obtain any goods.
Orders were not being filled and those
goods which did arrive were so involved in
the dock congestion as to be almost unobtainable. One of the customs regulations
of the Port refused the clearance of a shipment except in total. If part of a shipment were missing, nothing could be
cleared. Strenuous objection to this practice did finally bring about the establishment of the "quedan," which is a deposit
or guarantee covering all possible charges
against the missing portion of the shipment. Even this to-day is applicable only
to certain classes of merchandise.
Havana merchants placed large orders
in the hope that some of the goods would
get through. In some instances goods
were ordered shipped to Matanzas to be
brought to Havana by truck. Price meant
little so long as the goods were to be had.
Then there came the time when the
overstocking of merchandise, particularly
in the United States, was realized, and

Cuban orders, shipment of which the merchants little expected, were filled promptly.
In the summer of 1920, the Port of H a vana was completely paralyzed with ship
after ship lying at anchor waiting to discharge its cargo. What little work the
dock laborers did was handicapped by
customs regulations. Goods were transferred to wharves and lighters until such
capacity was exhausted. A n y breakage in
shipments in the transfer meant refusal of
clearance.
Millions of dollars' worth of goods were
thus piled up in the Havana congestion
when the storm began to break in the fall
of 1920. Merchants who had obtained
letters of credit at banks became powerless to take up their shipping documents
and banks found themselves with shipments to be disposed of. Sight drafts with
shipping documents attached were not accepted and accumulated in large numbers
awaiting advice from shippers.
A campaign started by the Rotary Club
of Havana when its members donned overalls and went to the docks to work was
finally successful in centering opinion upon
the dock congestion. A commission was
sent from the United States to assist. A
new regime was established and merchants
were told that they must remove their
goods immediately upon notice. A n old
abandoned cemetery and other vacant
properties were obtained and enclosed,
and non-perishable goods uncalled for by
consignees were deposited there and stored
under tarpaulins or such other protection
as could be erected.
The docks were cleared but the credit
situation will take many months to work
itself out. Vast quantities of merchandise
are now on hand in Cuba bought at tremendously high prices and surcharged with
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excessive handling costs. Necessarily much
of this must be sold in a market where
falling prices appear to be the prospect.
Rice importers and dry-goods merchants
have extremely aggravated situations to
deal with.
That part of the banking business which
centers upon the commodity credit has
been severely strained. The financial outlook of the merchants themselves is not a
favorable one. They have maintained
their high prices, believing that a refusal
to import new goods would compel the
people to buy those on hand at old prices.
The anticipated sales have not been made
and the merchants are facing the prospect
of competition with goods purchased in
the readjusted markets of the rest of the
world. In some cases they are now turning to their creditors in the United States
and Europe to share their losses with them
by a cancellation of part of their debts, explaining that more will be received in that
way than i f the Cuban house is forced to
suspend payment of liabilities, which is a
Cuban procedure in insolvency.
Another factor having its effect upon the
merchandise credit, although only to a
limited extent, is the Cuban insurance
company. N o t required by law to maintain reserves to cover liabilities to policyholders, any such action has been voluntary. Rumors are therefore easy of circulation and only a complete investigation
of some of the companies attacked could
establish their solvency. Perhaps the present situation will cause the enactment of
adequate insurance laws and provide for
their enforcement. A t present most of
the marine and fire risks are carried by
foreign companies.
With all the difficulties of trading, the
uncertain value of merchandise credits,
and the question of shipping documents as
security, the failure of the Banco Nacional
de Cuba might not have occurred had it
not been for the wild speculation in sugar.
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There are those who pay to the former
president of the Banco Nacional the honor
of saying that had he not been absent because of critical illness in his family he
could have held the situation in check.
Normally selling at from 3 ¼ to 4 cents
per pound, sugar was forced up until the
price of 2 3 ½ cents was reached in June,
1920. Belief was common among some
that the price would go to 30 cents or
higher. Vast loans were obtained from
the banks for purchase of sugar properties
and the growing of cane, for the purchase
and development of mills, for the financing
of expenditures incident to delivery and
sale of sugar. In addition to the loans for
development, there was the speculation in
sugar itself.
In recalling this sugar bubble that grew
and burst, one must remember that the
instincts of chance are much more general
among the Latin-Americans and whetted
just a little bit more keenly than the present day Anglo-Saxon community contemplates. Like some other governments Cuba
conducts every ten days a national lottery
and every Cuban has his expectation that
he is going to win one of the big prizes on
some chance he takes. Cuba also permits
the operation of a public roulette wheel.
The bankers had an exceptional opportunity while it lasted. Interest rates
mounted higher and higher. Time loans
up into the millions were negotiated at 13
per cent. compounded monthly. As the
price of sugar advanced, loans were i n creased accordingly. Lacking laws regulating reserve funds, stockholders' liability, or even stockholders' contribution of
cash, there was a great temptation for
banks to take long chances and to make
big loans where interest returns were large.
But the price of sugar, reaching its crest
in June, 1920, began to fall. The high i n itial price and the effect of the rate of foreign exchange produced a fabulous price
for sugar in Europe and that market be-
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came practically closed. Banks with sugar
hypothecations called upon their borrowers
to cover wherever possible. Where nothing else could be obtained, the banks had
to be satisfied with the pledge of future
crops contained in their contracts of hypothecation. The price continued to fall
and has now reached 41/8cents.
The crash with the banks came on October 8, 1920, when a large check was presented to the Banco Internacional, which
acknowledged its inability to pay and suspended payment. The following morning
there were runs on the Banco Español de
la Isla de Cuba and the Banco Nacional de
Cuba. The short business day of Saturday
was in the favor of the banks, and on Sunday, October 10, President Menocal declared a moratorium under which the
banks need pay immediately only 10 per
cent. of their liability to depositors.
For a day or two some banks did not
observe the moratorium. Then an agreement was worked out by the banks to
stand together and not allow the withdrawal of funds beyond the ten per cent.
limit. Deposits made after the moratorium were subject to withdrawal in full
at any time.
E l Banco Internacional and E l Banco
Español de la Isla de Cuba came forward
with offers to their depositors of managers'
certificates or bonds covering the amounts
of their deposits. Some depositors, believing that they would obtain more by
accepting the certificates and allowing the
banks to continue, did so. The success of
such a scheme will depend upon a sufficient number of depositors accepting the
certificates to relieve the immediate embarrassment of the situation, and then the
obtaining of sufficient new deposits and
new business to relieve the top-heavy capital condition created by the interestbearing certificates.
A proposal strongly urged by many was
that the Banco Nacional be authorized to
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issue paper money and thus supply the
currency necessary for the liquidation of
the moratorium liabilities. Another plan
was for the establishment of a clearing
house with power to issue certificates which
should pass as currency. It was with great
difficulty that the issue of fiat money was
avoided. Even now it is constantly suggested.
Just before the expiration of the moratorium, a law was passed known as the
Torriente Law, providing for the liquidation of moratorium debts. Taking effect
January 27, 1921, it provided that commercial debts should be paid 15 per cent.
within 15 days, 25 per cent. within 45 days,
25 per cent. within 75 days, and the
remainder, or 35 per cent., within 105 days.
Bank balances as of the date of the moratorium were subject to withdrawal 15 per
cent. in 15 days, 15 per cent. in 45 days,
20 per cent. in 75 days, 25 per cent. in 105
days, and 25 per cent. in 135 days.
The hope behind the Torriente Law was
that the sales of the current crop of sugar
would produce funds for the gradual liquidation of the moratorium obligations. A
disquieting feature, however, was the presence in Cuba of large amounts of the previous crop still on hand. General estimates
were made that the whole current crop
would have to be sold at from five to six
cents to provide any possibility of liquidation. Subsequent estimates have set
the figure necessary to clear the situation
as low as 4 ¼ cents.
(To be concluded)

We note with pleasure that M r . E . A .
Kracke, Manager of the Chicago Office,
has recently obtained the C . P . A . certificate of Illinois; also that M r . T . U . Conner,
of the Atlanta Office, has obtained the
C. P. A . certificate of the State of N e w
York.
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Cuba's Financial Situation—(Concluded)
B y C . M . C L A R K , Acting Manager, Havana Office

A

S U G A R B O A R D was created to
maintain the price of sugar and control sales. The most powerful means
which the Board could have had to control the situation, it did not possess,
namely, the ability to finance the mills
and the crop. The price has been maintained to a certain extent but sales have
been limited. Considerable activity was
evidenced during the latter part of A p r i l
in transferring sugar to the United States
in order to have it landed there before the
Fordney tariff provisions should become
effective, but such transfers were not necessarily sales.
Little difficulty was experienced by the
banks in February. The Torriente Law
required only a payment of 15 per cent. of
moratorium balances and 10 per cent. had
already been paid. The middle of March
was passed without trouble although the
pinch for money was beginning to be felt.
The planters needed money, the mills
needed money, in fact throughout the interior of the island it was difficult, almost
impossible, to get money.
On behalf of the Banco Nacional, a commission was sent to the United States to
secure the necessary funds for the middle
of April moratorium payment. On A p r i l
9 the bank announced its inability to secure the necessary funds and did not open
its doors for business.
Acting in good faith with the post moratorium depositors, the bank issued to them
drafts on the Royal Bank of Canada for
their balances. Its affairs were then turned
over to a liquidating commission.

Directly following the closing of the
Banco Nacional vehement attacks were
made upon the American and Canadian
banks, particularly upon the Royal Bank
of Canada. The consequent run upon that
bank was met only by telegraphic instructions to remain open until midnight if
necessary to pay depositors. Rumor that
the foreign banks would not stand behind
their Cuban branches was thus successfully met.
During the week of A p r i l 11, a loan, said
to be $20,000,000, was obtained by a
combination of financial interests, and a
corporation was formed to finance the mills
and the sugar crop. This organization has
been credited with the ability to raise
whatever funds are necessary for its purposes. It is backed by the interests of the
Guaranty Trust Company of New York,
the Royal Bank of Canada, and The N a tional City Bank of New Y o r k .
The situation as this article is written
has eased considerably but the next strain
will probably occur as the date for the middle of M a y moratorium payment approaches. The political situation has been
cleared by the recognition by the United
States of D r . Alfredo Zayas as the duly
elected President of Cuba to take office on
M a y 20, 1921, and by the withdrawal of
General Jose Miguel Gomez from the
political field.
There is a great deal of hoarding of
money. Importation and sale of small
family safes is extensive. A practice which
dates back to the time when merchants
throughout the island had more confidence
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in the people who sold them merchandise
than in the banks shows evidence of being
revived. Deposits with the merchants of
Havana are being made by their customers, to be disposed of in accordance with
instructions. Such deposits, however, cannot bear interest or else the Havana merchant would subject himself to the banker's tax. H o w long these practices will
continue, and whether there will be the
burglaries that usually ensue, only time
will tell.
For a clear understanding of the effect
upon the Island of Cuba of the closing of
the Banco Nacional, it must be mentioned
that this bank with its principal office in
Havana, maintained 135 branches throughout the island. E l Banco Español de la
Isla de Cuba with its principal office in
Havana also operates many branches.
Confidence between the American and
Canadian banks on the one hand and the
people of Cuba on the other is a little too
far strained to permit a ready solution of
the problem by American financing. The
newspapers of Cuba have little understood
that a policy of conservatism on their part
would do much to help the situation.
They have made bitter attacks upon the
banks with no regard for the effect of such
articles in destroying confidence. The
foreign banks are a little hesitant about
taking deposits that will be withdrawn at
the next rumor. A n d their loans are
greatly hampered by the Cuban custom
which is to loan largely on name and
persuasion.
Financial statements are not usually
offered, but will be supplied from the books
when requested. Such statements are not
to be questioned without apparent insult
to the client. They must be assumed to
be correct because the Cuban law places
certain restrictions upon the keeping of
books. T o doubt the correctness of accounts is to question the integrity of the
organization and the honesty of the book-

& SELLS

53

keeper, according to the Cuban attitude.
That the bookkeeper may have unintentionally made some mistakes or that he
may not have thoroughly understood the
accounting principles necessary to record
in a proper way some transactions, is given
no consideration.
One of the outstanding examples of
credit is revealed in the announcement in
the newspapers of the meeting of the creditors of one individual who owes $28,000,000, and whose pyramid of debt was
built for the purchase of property at highly
inflated values with no margin of safety.
Liquidation of such liabilities, if possible
at all, cannot be accomplished for years.
While the assets include two sugar centrals, a refinery, some land, securities and
contracts, it is difficult to see how these
can keep up the interest on such heavy
loans and make any substantial reduction
of principal.
The situation now is one of anxious hope.
The mills are grinding and there is evidence of activity which ought to produce
some value for purposes of liquidation.
Rumors constantly come to Havana that
certain large mills have closed for want of
funds. B u t as yet these remain unconfirmed. The end of the grinding season
will, without doubt, find many heavy
credits not liquidated. A system of American warehouses has been established and
is being extended to take care of some of
the sugar that is not sold.
Cuba may reach a situation this summer
or fall where it will have to face large credits unliquidated by the present crop and
with little prospect of further extensive
liquidation until the grinding season of
1922. This is not necessarily pessimistic
prophecy. It is an eventuality to be considered as a part of the financial outlook.
There is little doubt but that many in
Cuba have learned from bitter experience
that certainty should be the foundation of
banking and finance in so far as certainty

54

HASKINS

is possible. A n d where estimates of the
future must be made, such estimate should
be based upon known facts as to present
conditions, and as to the results of past
efforts.
For some the lesson will not have been
sufficiently plain and the old "rule of
thumb" methods will continue. That persons will be able to build credits into the

& SELLS

June

millions of dollars without presenting certified statements, however, is hardly to be
looked for again. Such credits will be established not upon one's estimate of what
he has, nor upon a certification of what
his books say, but upon impartial competent opinion expressed after careful investigation, and substantiated by figures
verified and presented.

